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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Wrongful Birth * Preconception Torts 0
Duty to Inform of Genetic Risks
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
N 1977 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, decided in
Park v. Chessin1 that an infant born deformed has a cause of action for
its "wrongful life." This was the first time an appellate court in the United
States had granted such a cause of action and asserted "the fundamental
right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being."' Park was
decided fourteen years after the first reported "wrongful fife" suit in the
United States3 and ninety-three years after Justice Holmes had declared
that an infant cannot recover for prenatal injuries.' This decision spawned
a number of articles and notes in scholarly journals.' However, late in
1978, under the title Becker v. Schwartz,6 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of the Appellate Division in Park v. Chessin and brought
New York's position on wrongful birth and wrongful life7 back into ac-
cord with that of most other jurisdictions that have considered the issues.'
Similar facts are asserted in Park v. Chessin and its companion case
Becker v. Schwartz. Both cases deal with the physicians' allegedly negligent
failure to inform the parents of the risk of the wife bearing a genetically
deformed child so that the parents could decide whether to have the child.
In Becker, Delores Becker, age thirty-seven, learning she was pregnant,
consulted the defendants, specialists in obstetrics and gynecology. She re-
160, A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
2ld. at 88, 114.
3 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, N.E.2d 849 (1963).
4 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). For an excellent history
of claims for prenatal injury from Dietrich to Park, see Robertson, Toward Boundaries of
Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrong-
ful Life, 1978 DuKE LJ. 1401.
6 Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Frame-
work, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 125 (1978); Wrongful Life, 17 J. FAM. L. 199 (1978);
Note, Torts-Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REV. (1979); Note, Father and Mother Know
Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling; 87 YALE L.J.
1488 (1978).
- 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
7 Like many other writers but not all justices, I distinguish between the terms "wrongful
birth" and "wrongful fife." "Wrongful birth" is the broader term, indicating that but for
someone's negligence the infant would not have been born. It also refers specifically to the
parents' claim that they have been injured as a result of that birth. "Wrongful life" refers
to the child's claim, to his legal cry of "I wish I had never been born."8 See Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978). And later cases: Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546
(Ala, 1978); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Penn, 1978); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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mained under the defendants' care until after the birth of her daughter.
The child was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome9 and subsequently was
institutionalized. Plaintiffs contended that the'defendant physicians in-
formed the parents neither of the increased risk of Down's Syndrome in
infants born to women over the age of thirty-five nor of the availability of
amniocentesisl'--a medical procedure that could have determined whether
the fetus Mrs. Becker was carrying was afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Plain-
tiff's further contended that but for the negligence of the defendants in failing
to inform their patient, Mrs. Becker would have had the amniocentesis test,
would have learned that her child would be born mentally retarded and
physically deformed, and would have elected to abort the fetus. 1
In Park, Hetty Park had given birth to a child afflicted with polycystic
kidney disease, who died a few hours after birth. 2 Shortly thereafter, she
and her husband questioned her obstetricians as to the odds of a second
infant being afflicted with the same disorder. The defendants allegedly re-
plied that the disease was not hereditary and the chances of a second
child having it were practically nil. As a consequence of these assurances,
the plaintiffs intentionally conceived a second child. This baby also was
born with polycystic kidney disease, but managed to survive for two and
a half years before dying from the progressive effects of the disease. The
plaintiffs allege that-contrary to the assurances of the defendants-poly-
cystic kidney disease is hereditary and that, had the defendants correctly
informed the Parks of this fact, they would have elected not to conceive
another child.'
Both pairs of parents sued on their own behalfs for (1) the expenses
incurred in the care and treatment of the infants and for (2) the mental
distress caused them by the birth of a defective child. They also sought
damages on behalf of the children for (3) wrongful life. The Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged the first claim as valid, but dismissed the second and
third. It dismissed the claims for damages for emotional distress on the
precedent of its 1977 decision in Howard v. Lecher" and upon the difficulty
of ascertaining the value of mitigated damages prescribed by Restatement
9 Down's Syndrome is more commonly referred to as mongolism. It is a syndrome of
mental retardation associated with a variable constellation of physical abnormalities caused
by a chromosomal anomaly.
1OAmniocentesis is a "transabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac." STED-
MAN'S MEDICAL DIcIONARY, 3d UNAi iDED LAWYER'S EDITION 1236 (1972). Biochemical
tests are performed on the sample of amniotic fluid withdrawn, often times allowing the
detection of chromosomal abnormality.
"146 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-98.
12 Polycystic disease of the kidneys is a condition "characterized by numerous cysts . . .
scattered diffusely throughout the kidneys, sometimes resulting in organs that tend to re-
semble grapelike clusters of cysts." (Stedman's Medical Dictionary. 1 3d Unabridged
Lawyer's Edition 669, 1972).
Is 46 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
14 42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 N.E.2d 64 (1977).
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(Second) of Torts section 920.'1 It dismissed the wrongful life claims of
the infants because the infants had suffered no legally cognizable injury
and, even if they had, calculations of damages would be impossible.
I. PARENTS' ACTION FOR DAMAGES
Just a year before Becker, the Court of Appeals had heard Howard v.
Lecher" - a case based on a very similar set of facts. Mrs. Howard had
given birth to a daughter with Tay-Sachs disease."' The Howards sued
the physician, contending that he should have known of the increased
risk that the fetus would suffer from the disease and so should have
tested for its presence, and asserting that, had the Howards been informed
that the fetus was afflicted with Tay-Sachs, they would have chosen to
abort it. The Court of Appeals dismissed the parents' action for damages
for mental distress.
The Howard majority viewed the parents as mere bystanders to the
negligent injury of their child and thus denied them a cause of action under
New York's bystander rule." ' The "[1]aw has repeatedly denied recovery
for mental and emotional injuries suffered by a third party as a result of
injuries sustained by another."1" In reaching its decision, the court begged
the question of whether or not the physician owed a duty of care directly
to the parents to diagnose for Tay-Sachs prenatally."
Reading the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Howard, one suspects
that the court is actually concerned about the facts of the case. By deny-
ing a cause of action the court is preventing a jury from possibly finding
negligence on the part of the physician who fails to screen (or at least to
inform of the availability of such screening) Jewish couples automatically
for Tay-Sachs genes. This-far more than the awarding of damages to
parents for the emotional distress caused by physicians whose failure to
inform has been proven negligent-seems to be "the extension of tradi-
tional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds"'" that the court fears. In
15See note 24, intra.
1 42 N.Y.2d 109, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977).
17 Tay-Sachs is a fatal progressive degenerative disease of the nervous system which primarily
affects the Eastern European Jewish population and their progeny. Only where both parents are
carriers will be their be a great likelihood of the presence of Tay-Sachs in their children.
Tay-Sachs victims generally live for 2-5 years.
'sSee Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), and
cases cited therein.
19 42 N.Y.2d at 112, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
2 0 This point is made by Judge Cooke in his dissenting opinion. Cooke argues that the
bystander rule is inapplicable because "lilt was the mother here to whom the defendant'sduty was owed"-i.e., she was not a bystander. Cooke asserts that the applicable rule isthat enunciated in Johnson v. State (37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-384; 334 N.E.2d 590, 593;372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642-643); "[T]here may be recovery for the emotional harm, even inthe absence of fear of potential physical injury, to one subjected directly to the negli-gence of another as long as the psychic injury was genuine, substantial, and proximately
caused by defendant's conduct." 42 N.Y.2d at 115-116, 366 N.E.2d at 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d
at 367.
2" 42 N.Y.2d at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
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other words, the court "refused to impose upon all obstetricians the duty of
becoming forced genetic counselors."22
The facts in Park presented a much stronger case of negligence. Here
the plaintiff parents asked the physician a specific question. He had reason
to believe the plaintiffs would rely upon his answer, and he misinformed them.
The Court of Appeals granted the parents a cause of action for their
pecuniary damages (an issue with which the court did not deal in How-
ard), while the precedent of Howard required them to dismiss the claim
for emotional distress. However, in granting the parents' claims for medical
and support expenses, the court acknowledged that the parents were not
mere bystanders to the injury of the child, that the physician owed them
(or at least owed the mother)2" a duty of due care. Thus Howard was
upheld while its reasoning was undercut.
To bolster its denial of the parents' claim for emotional distress dam-
ages, the Court of Appeals asserted that such damages would be "to specula-
tive to permit recovery," since under the "benefits rule" articulated in section
920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2" the parents' anguish at the
birth of a deformed child may yet be offset by the parental love "that
even an abnormality cannot fully dampen."25
The Court of Appeals had adopted this reasoning in 1972 in Stewart
v. Long Island College Hospital" when it affirmed the Appellate Division's
dismissal of a similar suit by parents of a child born with rubella syn-
drome. The Appellate Division had noted: "It would be virtually im-
possible to evaluate as compensatory damages the anguish to the parents
of rearing a malformed child as against the denial to them of the benefits
of parenthood."2 '
In Berman v. Allan," (decided after Becker v. Schwartz) the Supreme
22 60 A.D.2d at 84; 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112. The textual discussion of the unspoken rationale
of Howard is that offered by the Appellate Division, 2d Department, in distinguishing Park
from Howard.
23See Cooke's dissent in Howard, 42 N.Y.2d at 116, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
368, suggesting the father cannot recover for his mental distress because, since he is not
a patient, the physician owes him no duty of care.
2 4 R.FsTATEMENT (SEcoNm) oF ToRTs, § 920 (1977), Benefit to Plaintiff resulting from De-
fendant's Tort: "When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so
doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this
is equitable."
25 46 N.Y.2d at 414, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
26 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
27 35 A.D.2d 531, 532; 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503, (1970); affd 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616,
332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972), citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
For a description of the "benefits" of such parenthood see Stockton, A Death in the Fam-
ily, N.Y. Times, August 12, 1979, (magazine), at 28. Stockton tells the story of a young
family whose physician neglected to test prenatally for Tay-Sachs disease.
280 NJ. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
ReceNT CAsesFall, 1919]
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Court of New Jersey recently upheld the wrongful birth claim of parents
of a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Curiously, the New Jersey court
sustained the validity of the parents' claim for damages for emotional dis-
tress but-relying on the "benefits rule"--denied the parents' claim for
damages for medical and other expenses. The court stated: "In essence,
Mr. and Mrs. Berman desire to retain all the benefits inhering in the birth
of the child-i.e., the love and joy they will experience as parents-while
saddling defendants with the enormous expenses attendant upon her rear-
ing."' Such reasoning apparently ignores the limitation placed on the con-
cept of benefit by section 920 of the Restatement-that the benefit must
accrue to the interest damaged, that pecuniary damages cannot be offset by
emotional benefits. 0 The true basis for the court's refusal to find the ex-
penses of rearing a handicapped child recoverable becomes clear as the
court continues: "[S]uch an award would be wholly disproportionate to
the culpability involved, and the allowance of such a recovery would both
constitute a windfall to the parents and place too unreasonable a financial
burden upon physicians.' '"1 The court is grasping at the "benefits rule" to
curtail a damage award it feels will be too harsh on the defendant. Al-
though the damages recoverable for wrongful birth in New Jersey (emot-
ional distress only) are the opposite of those recoverable in New York
(expenses only)-the rules in both states reflect an attempt to limit the
physician's liability and prevent the possibility of excessive judgments.
II. WRONGFUL LIFE
In Becker v. Schwartz the Court of Appeals found "two flaws in plain-
tiffs' claims on behalf of their infants for wrongful life." First, the law does
not recognize the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child. "Wheth-
er it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with
even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philos-
ophers and the theologians. 2 Second, even if the law should make such a
determination, it would be incapable of assessing damages. For how can
one arrive at the difference in value between life in an impaired state and
nonexistence, when one has no knowledge of the nature of nonexistence up-
on which to base an estimate of its value?3
The Court of Appeals had already used both of these arguments to
deny recovery for wrongful life in the leading New York case of Williams
v. State.' In Williams, the infant plaintiff alleged that the State of New
29 Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
30 Restatement, § 920(b): Limitation to the same interest. "Damages resulting from an
invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has been
benefited.
32 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
32 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
3 3 Id.
34 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
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York had been negligent in its care of her mentally defective mother in a
state institution and that as a result of the state's neglect her mother was
raped and she was conceived. Through the state's negligence, she had been
deprived of property rights, a normal childhood and homelife, proper par-
ental care, support and rearing. She was also forced to bear the stigma of
illegitimacy. The Court of Appeals denied her claim, holding that: "Being
born under one set of circumstances rather than another or to one pair of
parents rather than to another is not a suable wrong that is cognizable in
court."35 The Williams court looked to the earlier Michigan case of Zepeda
v. Zepeda,3 6 in which an infant plaintiff was denied a cause of action in a
suit against his putative father for the stigma of his bastardy. The court
there expressed a fear that allowing the infant Zepeda his claim would open
the doors of the courthouse to those protesting such fortuities as their
race or their parents' poverty.
Similarly, the second point made by the Court of Appeals in denying
infants Becker and Park causes of action for wrongful life - namely,
that the calculation of compensatory damages would be impossible--de-
rived from Justice Keating's concurring opinion in Williams. And Keating
in turn borrowed his analysis from an assay prompted by the Zepeda
case written by Tedeschi, one of the first scholars to explore the topic of
wrongful life.8"
It is interesting to note that the first "wrongful life" suits and the ones
in which the courts first held that being born into one set of circumstances
rather than another is not a suable wrong were suits by illegitimates, not
by the physically or mentally deformed. Had the first wrongful life plain-
tiff been Lara Parks, for example, the court might have asserted with as
much logic as it did in Williams, but undoubtedly with less confidence,
that a court cannot determine whether non-life is preferable to handicapped
life. Twelve years later, when Lara Parks did come before the court, the
court had precedent as a shield to protect it from the ugly and tragic reali-
ties of the baby's existence; they need not scrutinize her life so closely, but
need only gently lay over it ready-made phrases.
Becker was not the first case, however, to dismiss a wrongful life
claim by a physically and mentally handicapped plaintiff. In 1967 in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,"8 the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed the com-
plaint of an infant born with rubella syndrome as a result of the defendant
physician's failure to inform its mother of the risks to the fetus of maternal ru-
bella during the early weeks of pregnancy. Gleitman became the leading case
on a physician's liability for failure to inform parents of the danger of genetic
85 Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
" 41 111. App. 2d at 240, 190 N.E.2d at 849 (1963).
37 Note, On Tort Liability for Wrongful Life, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966).
38 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 22 A.L.R.3d 1411 (1967).
Fall, 1979]
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defect in their child. Essentially, the New Jersey court held, as the New
York court did in Williams, that one cannot measure life with defects
against the "utter void of nonexistence."" Gleitman was specifically fol-
lowed by New York in Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital,"° where an-
other infant plaintiff suffering from rubella syndrome filed an unsuccessful
claim against a hospital for failing to perform an abortion on her mother
and terminate her life. Thus by the time the New York Court of Appeals
considered the two cases in Becker, the principle that an infant's claim
for wrongful life was not recognizable was well established both within
the state and without.'
HI. PRECONCEPTION TORTS
The facts in Becker v. Schwartz and Park v. Chessin were similar
enough for the Court of Appeals to decide the two cases together. Both are
essentially malpractice cases. Both deal with the alleged negligence of a
physician for failing to inform or for misinforming a patient about the
risks of a serious genetic or chromosomal defect in a fetus. Neither suit
contends that the physician caused the defect in the child, but only that
his actions deprived the parents of the opportunity not to bear the handi-
capped child. In both cases, the parents had to allege that, had the phy-
sician properly informed them, they would have acted so as to prevent
the birth or the conception of the child--either by having an abortion or by
using contraception.
On the theoretical level, however, each case presents several issues
distinct from the other. Park belongs to a small group of cases dealing
with "preconception torts." The act that the infant plaintiff alleges injured
him (the physician's statement that polycystic kidney disease is not here-
ditary) was performed before he was even conceived. This raises such
questions as: Can a person have a duty of care to one not in existence?
And if so, can one breach this duty before the person to whom one owes it
exists? In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,"2 an Illinois appeals court answered
these questions in the affirmative. In this case, the defendant hospital negli-
gently transfused Rh positive blood to the infant plaintiffs Rh negative
mother eight years before the plaintiff was conceived. This transfusion re-
sulted in the plaintiff being born with multiple injuries. The Renslow court
held that one could have a duty to one not yet conceived, and that the
infant plaintiff belonged to a foreseeable class of people-future children
of the adolescent woman transfused-to whom the hospital owed a duty
39Id.
4030 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
41 For a list of the wrongful life claims that have been dismissed, see Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15
(1978). And later causes listed supra note 8. Gleitman has recently been partially overruled
by Berman v. Allen. Berman creates a cause of action for wrongful birth but still denies
one to the infant for his wrongful life.
4240 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
[Vol. 13:2
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of due care. A similar analysis was employed in the Trial Term's favorable
decision in Parks: the physician who was asked what the chances were of
a second child of the Parks having polycystic kidneys reasonably could
have foreseen the class of possible future children to which the infant plain-
tiff belonged. 3 The Renslow court resolved the problem of how one could
injure someone not yet in existence by separating the concept of tortious
conduct from that of injury. It held that the tortious conduct occurred
before conception, the injury after. The same type of analysis, when ap-
plied to the facts of Park, does not facilitate recovery, for the tortious act
occurred before conception and the injury at conception. Thus the para-
dox: plaintiff brings suit because of his conception; but without his con-
ception there would be no plaintiff to bring suit. (This is why the Appellate
Division, when it granted the infant plaintiff a cause of action, did so not
for her "wrongful life" but for "pain and suffering.")"
One can also see that the difliculty of ascertaining damages that
troubled the Court of Appeals in Park did not exist in Renslow. In Rens-
low, but for the defendant's negligence the plaintiff would have been born
healthy. Thus the measure of damages is the difference in value between
plaintiff's life and the life of a healthy child. There's no need to contem-
plate the value of the void.
Given a jurisdiction that permits a cause of action for prenatal in-
juries to a child born alive,4" and given strong evidence of causation-the
plaintiff in a preconception tort case should often prevail, for preconception
tort cases alone do not present the logical and theoretical problems of wrong-
ful life suits. "
IV. IMPACT OF THE LEGALIZATION OF ABORTION
Park v. Chessin is in essence a "right-not-to-conceive" (and a "right-
not-to-be-conceived") suit. It is almost the only suit for wrongful life brought
by a deformed infant and/or his parents that is of this type.," The others-
including Becker v. Schwartz - are "right-to-abort" (and "right-to-be-
aborted") cases.
The first of these right-to-abort cases, Gleitman v. Cosgrove,"' denied
both the infant's and the parents' claims. The parents' claim was dismissed
43 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Queens Cty., 1976).
" 60 A.D.2d 80, 87; 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114, (1977).
45 See Robertson, supra note 4.
"For further discussion of Park and Renslow and the concept of the pre-conception tort,
see Robertson, supra note 4. See also, Comment, Preconception Torts: Forseeing the Uncon-
ceived, 48 U. COL. L. REv. 621 (1977); Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of
Liability, 56 NEB. L. REv. 706 (1977).
47 For another such suit see Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978). In Elliot, how-
ever, the child's deformities were only coincidental to the physician's alleged negligence in
performing an unsuccessful vasectomy.
4849 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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in part because the abortion the mother would have sought had the de-
fendant informed her of the danger that the fetus was impaired was crimi-
nal in the state of New Jersey."9 Anti-abortion sentiment permeates the
opinion."0 George Annas has observed about the Gleitman decision:
What was probably really at stake (although the court seems to deny
it) is a belief that life itself is always and under all circumstances a
blessing. It is, however, precisely because this premise is not accepted
that a couple seeks amniocentesis in the first place, i.e., their desire is
to give birth only to a genetically normal child. If amniocentesis fol-
lowed by abortion of affected fetuses is accepted as an appropriate
decision, compensation for birth of an affected fetus due to medical
negligence should also be accepted. Nothing in any of the other so-
called "wrongful life" cases argues against this conclusion. 1
Certainly the decision in Roe v. Wade,52 legalizing abortion has undercut
the rationale of the Gleitman court and those that have followed it. Since
1973, when Roe v. Wade granted a woman the absolute right to terminate
a pregnancy during the first trimester, courts have begun to grant malpractice
claims for the negligent abridgement of that right.5 3
The first case in which the parents who were denied an opportunity to
abort a deformed fetus were granted a cause of action was Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital," another case in which the infant was born with rubella
syndrome. The court held that the physician's duty did not extend beyond
advising the woman of the effects of maternal rubella on the fetus. He had
no duty to advise the patient of the availability of abortion-that being a
legal, not a medical question. Furthermore, the plaintiff had to convince
the trier of fact that she would have sought an abortion had she been in-
formed of the possible effects of rubella on the fetus and that an abortion
would have been legally available. The Dumer court denied the infant a
cause of action and limited the parents' damages to the additional medical,
hospital, and support expenses occasioned by the child's deformities beyond
those of raising a normal child.
Becker is distinguished from Dumer in that the New York court did
not limit the recovery of the parents so severely but granted to Mr. and
Mrs. Becker "the sums expended for the long-term institutional care of
their retarded child," and to Mr. and Mrs. Park "the care and treatment
of their child until her death."5
4 This aspect of Gleitman has been overruled by Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8.
50 Robertson, supra note 4.
51 Note, "Fitness" for Birth & Reproduction: Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, 9
FAM. L.Q. 463, 477 (1975).
52410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95 For a list, see Annot. 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
5460 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W. 2d 372, 83 A.L.R.3d 1 (1975).
n5 46 N.Y.2d at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902, 903,
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In the passage quoted above, Annas does not distinguish between the
claims of the parents and those of their infants. He implies, however, that
Roe v. Wade mandates recovery by the child as well as by the parents. But
certainly the right-to-abort does not imply the right-to-be-aborted.
Roe gives the interests of the woman supremacy over those of the fetus
during the first trimester. However, to grant the fetus a cause of action for
"wrongful life" would, by magnifying its interests during that period, po-
tentially pit them against those of the woman. Although Roe would not
bar suits by an infant against a physician, such suits could undermine the
premises of Roe. For example, many commentators who support the legal
recognition of claims for wrongful life look forward to the extension of such
claims to those naming the parents as defendants. 6 For another, Roe holds
that the fetus is not legally a person entitled to fourteenth amendment
protection. But each time a court grants a fetus a remedy or a right it is
supplying additional arguments to those who would maintain that the Roe
court was mistaken and that the fetus is indeed a "person" under our laws.
Furthermore, the nature of the question-whether nonexistence is
preferable to handicapped existence-potentially conflicts with a woman's
right to choose an abortion. To date the courts have held that whether or
not a handicapped life is of greater value than non-existence is not a matter
capable of legal determination. To acknowledge wrongful life claims, the
courts would have to assert that this is indeed a matter for the law to
decide. Weighing life against nothingness, they might declare not that a
fetus had a right-to-non-existence, but that it had a "right to life," despite
handicaps.
To grant a cause of action to a severely deformed infant is superficially
appealing, but-in addition to threatening a significant right-it might not
be needed. In most cases the family can recover its expenses through a
suit by the parents. The infant's pain and suffering may often be rather
legalistic, for these children are often so severely retarded or diseased that
their consciousness of what they are enduring is sharply limited if not non-
existent. Furthermore, the degree of additional deterrence to be achieved
by tacking the infant's claim onto that of the parents would appear minimal,
since the negligent physician's liability for the parent's expenses in main-
taining the diseased child coupled with their emotional distress at its birth
seems to be great enough to deter the physician to whatever degree one
can be deterred from negligent behavior. Since a cause of action for wrong-
ful life would provide small benefit and little deterrence, the primary in-
terest it would seem to further is that of sentimentality.
56 See, e.g., Tedescbi, On Tort Liability for Wrongful Life, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966).
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V. CONCLUSION
The recent development of genetic screening and amniocentesis and
the legalization of abortion have given potential parents new options and
physicians new responsibilities. The explosion in genetic knowledge will
no doubt lead to many suits seeking to define the extent of the physician's
duty to screen his patients for genetic defects. Becker v. Schwartz defines the
probable extent of the physician's liability in many jurisdictions for negli-
gently failing to inform patients of known risks and available tests and pro-
cedures. The parents may recover damages for pecuniary loss-perhaps for
the entire expense of maintaining the child. 7 But they may not recover dam-
ages for their pain and suffering. 8 Neither may the infant recover for
his wrongful life. The decision attempts to balance a desire to provide a
remedy for a painful wrong and a hesitancy to grant excessive damages
in a new cause of action. It may be observed, however, that the argument
denying the parents damages for their pain and suffering is somewhat
strained. One would expect a court in the near future to grant such dam-
ages as well as expense damages. On the other hand, the denial of the
infant's claim may be well grounded in logic and public policy.
GAIL WHITE SWEENEY
57 The Court of Appeals left the determination of how to calculate expense damages to the
lower court.
"8 See contra, Berman v. Allen.
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